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NOTES 
When It's OK To Sell the Monet: A Trnstee-Fiduciary-
Duty Framework for Analyzing the Deaccessioning 
of Art To Meet Museum Operating Expenses 
Jennifer L. White 
OORODUCTION 
Art museums present the paradox of being simultaneously very 
rich, because of the value of the assets they hold,1 and very poor, 
due to the illiquidity of those assets and high operation costs.2 
Although a quick calculation of a museum's physical assets, com-
posed primarily of its art collection, could yield a number reflecting 
large-scale wealth, the art museums of this country nevertheless are 
continually burdened by financial crises.3 
As a result of this financial hardship, it is not difficult to imagine 
the following situation: A museum needs funds, not for the pur-
pose of purchasing more art,4 but for a variety of other purposes, 
1. See STEPHEN E. WEIL, On a New Foundation: The American Art Museum Recon-
ceived, in A CABINET OF Curuosrrms: INQUIRIES INTO MUSEUMS AND THEIR PROSPECTS 81, 
84 (1995) (estimating that, in 1989, museums held $65 billion worth of art in their 
collections). 
2. See Peter Temin, An Economic History of American Art Museums, in THE EcoNOMics 
OF ART MusEUMS 179, 179-80 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1991) (stating that, while art museums 
have "substantial collections of assets," their operating budgets run at a deficit); STEPHEN E. 
WEIL, The Deaccession Cookie Jar, in A CABINET OF CuRiosrrms, supra note 1, at 139, 140 
("[I]n the particular case of museums, there is a grotesque disproportion between the esti-
mated market values of their collections and the funds that they generally have available to 
meet their ongoing operating needs."). 
3. Many factors have contributed to this condition, for example, a decrease in patronage 
from various sources, including individuals, foundations, and corporations, and a decline in 
supportive governmental policy for the arts, manifested in part by the budget cuts suffered by 
the National Endowment for the Arts. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Alexander Makes Case For the 
Arts Endowment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1995, at Bl. These declines in funding are unfortu-
nately accompanied by an increase in operating expenses, including the rising costs of 
purchasing and maintaining artwork. See STEPHEN E. WEIL, The Multiple Crises in Our Mu-
seums, in BEAUTY AND THE BEASTS: ON MUSEUMS, A.RT, THE LAw, AND THE MARKET 3, 5-7 
(1983) (discussing the financial crisis of "broke" museums facing "soaring expenses"); see 
also Richard E. Oldenburg, General Overview, in THE ECONOMICS OF A.RT MusEUMS, supra 
note 2, at 112, 113-15 (noting that the cost of art is rising while funding from various sources 
is disappearing); Richard N. Rosen, Art Museums in the United States: A Financial Portrait, 
in THE EcoNOMICS OF A.RT MusEUMs, supra note 2, at 129, 129-30 (noting that art museums 
are "plagued by rising costs of acquiring, caring for, and exhibiting fine art, shrinking support 
from some traditional sources of revenue, and decreasingly supportive public policy"). 
4. The storage rooms of many museums are already overflowing with excess works that 
are not exhibited. See Martin Feldstein, Introduction to THE EcoNOMICS OF ART MusEUMS, 
supra note 2, at 1, 8. 
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such as maintenance - including conservation of artwork as well as 
building repairs - personnel salaries, or repayment of loan debt. 
The museum director considers selling - or "deaccessioning"s -
certain works not controlled by donor restrictions.6 Neither the 
museum's trust instrument,7 if established as a trust, nor the mu-
seum's charter or bylaws, if a corporate entity, contemplates how 
proceeds from any forthcoming sale may be used.s It is unclear 
whether the director can apply the proceeds from the sale of the 
works toward the museum's operations budget rather than the art-
acquisitions budget.9 
With reduced funding, some museums have turned to "deacces-
sioning," the removal of an object from a museum collection with 
the intent to sell it. The current public outcry over deaccessioning 
highlights the :financial exigencies of art museums today, as re-
flected in the. above hypothetical. In the past, many in the museum 
world, as well as the public, found deaccessioning to be an unpalat-
able concept, as it involves contemplating each work of art in a mu-
seum collection as a fungible asset. Museum officials are 
understandably uncomfortable with this characterization of art; 
works of art have an intrinsic value to them which is completely 
5. Although "deaccessioning" literally refers just to the removal of the work from the 
collection, this Note uses it, as most commentators do, to stand for the entire process of 
liquidating artistic assets, with the sale of the work as the most important aspect of that 
process. See Linden Havemeyer Wise & Beverly M. Wolff, Deaccessioning, Disposition, and 
the Pledge of Museum Collections: The Legal Parameters, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM 
ADMINISTRATION 107, 109 n.l (A.L.1.-A.B.A. 1991). 
6. This Note does not discuss the issue of how museums deal with donor restrictions on 
bequests made to the museums. When making gifts to museums, donors often stipulate that 
their gifts cannot be sold. See STEPHEN E. WEIL, Deaccession Practices in American Muse-
ums, in RETHINKING THE MusEUM 105, 108 {1990). Donor restrictions on the disposition or 
use of objects presents the issue of the legality of the actual sale - as opposed to the use of 
the proceeds - and may call for the invocation of the cy pres doctrine by the courts in order 
to allow deviation from the terms of the donor's grant Cy pres is a 
doctrine in the law of charities whereby when it becomes impossible, impracticable, or 
illegal to carry out the particular purpose of the donor a scheme will be framed by a 
court to carry out the general intention by applying the gift to charitable purposes that 
are closely related or similar to the original purposes. 
Id. at 117 n.7. These deviations bring up sensitive issues of donors' intent that need not be 
contemplated for the topic at hand. When such restrictions are relevant to the discussion, 
they are specifically mentioned; otherwise, it may be assumed that no donor restrictions exist 
on any works of art earmarked for deaccessioning. 
7. The trust instrument or indenture is "the document by which property interests are 
vested in the trustee and beneficiary and the rights and duties of the parties (called the trust 
terms) are set forth." GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS§ 1 {6th ed. 1987). 
8. The form of organization typically taken by museums is discussed infra in section I.A. 
9. There are many cases similar to this scenario, but, for a typical situation, see 
Hammond Museum, Inc. v. Harshbarger, No. 92E-0067-Gl (P. & Fam. Ct. Essex County, 
Mass. Oct. 5, 1992). In Hammond Museum, the museum trustees sought court approval of a 
deaccessioning plan aimed at raising funds to pay off a bank loan and perform maintenance. 
The court approved the request but did not set forth any guidelines regarding the use of the 
deaccessioning proceeds. 
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distinct from their pecuniary value on the market.10 According to 
the International Council of Museums, a museum is "a permanent 
establishment administered in the public interest with a view to 
conserve, study, exploit by various means and, basically, to exhibit, 
for the pleasure and education of the public, objects of cultural 
value. "11 Although cultural value often translates into high dollar 
value, the cultural value of a work of art is an important considera-
tion independent of the price that work of art might bring on the 
market.12 
Despite these justifications for avoiding any form of deacces-
sioning, the museum community generally recognizes the propriety 
of selling artwork in order to purchase other - presumably supe-
rior or more appropriate - art for the collection.13 Some museum 
10. See STEPHEN E. WEIL, Testimony Prepared for the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, Norwalk, Connecticut, in A CABINET OF CuruosITIEs, supra note 1, at 145, 146-48 
(discussing the difficulty of valuing art because "art is in no way like such other subjects of 
appraisal as real estate in which there may be genuine comparables to support a valuation"); 
see also Steven L. Katz, Museum Trusteeship: The Fiduciary Ethic Applied, J. ARTS MGMT. 
& L., Winter 1987, at 57, 73 ("Unlike corporations, which may recover quarterly losses 
through subsequent sales of essentially fungible commodities, objects in museum collections 
are unique."); Joshua C. Taylor, The Art Museum in the United States, in ON UNDERSTAND-
ING ART MusEUMS 34, 37 (Sherman E. Lee ed., 1975) ("(A]ccepted works of art are not 
simply collectible curiosities or cultural artifacts, but have a moral and aesthetic existence of 
their own."). 
11. WILUAM HENDON, ANALyziNG AN ART MusEUM 27-30 (1979), reprinted in 2 JoHN 
HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 640, 641 (2d 
ed. 1987) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted); see also MERRYMAN & ELSEN, 
supra, at 640-50; STEPHEN E. WEIL, An Inventory of Art Museum Roles, in BEAUTY AND THE 
BEASTS, supra note 3, at 30, 31 ("The museum - in its most fundamental role - is that 
place where objects are preserved for the public to see."). The museum's special obligation 
to the public complicates even further the characterization of art as a financial asset: 
Those who are responsible for museums rightly see themselves as the protectors of the 
treasures that our generation has inherited from the past, as the collectors of the creative 
activity of the current time, and as teachers who help the broad public to know and 
appreciate these works of art. 
Feldstein, supra note 4, at 10. 
12. 
Because the forces that drive the market are not the same as those that drive art, and 
because the goals of the two are not the same, the museum must keep its sights clear on 
what is important in art and not be overly influenced or driven by what may be impor-
tant in the market 
Julia Brown Turrell, The Museum's Collection, in THE ECONOMICS OF ART MUSEUMS, supra 
note 2, at 15, 16. 
13. See, e.g., Feldstein, supra note 4, at 8 (noting the change of attitude toward deacces-
sioning despite a "natural reluctance" to endorse this practice); Elaine L. Johnston, Deacces-
sioning to Raise Operating Funds: Recent Cases, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM 
ADMINISTRATION 165, 167 (A.L.1.-A.B.A. 1993) ("It is well-established that a museum may 
legally and ethically deaccession collection objects in appropriate circumstances, provided 
there are no specific restrictions against disposal."); Katz, supra note 10, at 62 
("[DJeaccessioning in and of itself is not wrongful."); WEIL, supra note 6, at 105-06 ( describ-
ing the change in attitude toward deaccessioning as a process for "pruning and upgrading 
collections"); Wise & Wolff, supra note 5, at 110-15 (discussing cases demonstrating that "the 
courts have allowed museums wide latitude in disposing of works of art"). The codes of 
ethics aimed at museum professionals recognize the right of museums selectively to dispose 
of objects in order to improve the collection. See infra note 21. 
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directors14 now seek to extend the practice so that they may use 
deaccessioning proceeds for purposes other than buying art for the 
collection.15 These proposals have shifted the focus of the deacces-
sioning controversy from the overall propriety of selling objects to 
the permissible uses of the proceeds from these sales. 
Deaccessioning controversies generally come to the attention of 
courts in one of two ways: through directors seeking court approval 
prior to deaccessioning16 or through the state attorney general 
seeking to prevent such a transaction.17 The attorney general also 
14. In a nonprofit corporation, the preferred tenn for a member of the board is a trustee 
rather than a director. See HowARD L. OLECK & MARTHA E. STEWART, NONPROFIT CORPO-
RATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, & ASSOCIATIONS § 271 (6th ed. 1994). The director in the mu-
seum context usually refers to the professional who works directly with the curatorial staff 
and is accountable to the trustees. See Patty Gerstenblith, The Fiduciary Duties of Museum 
Trustees, 8 CoLUM. J. ART & L. 175, 177 n.5 (1983). Contrary to common practice, this Note 
refers to nonprofit board members as directors in order to avoid confusion with trustees of 
actual trusts. 
15. Recently, there have been some highly publicized cases of deaccessioning by muse-
ums or other nonprofit cultural institutions. See Michael Kimmelman, Should Old Masters 
Be Fund-Raisers?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, § 2, at 1 (describing a sale by the New York 
Historical Society of Old Master paintings for purposes of replenishing its endowment fund 
for operating expenses); Carol Vogel, Met Blocks Sale So It Can Keep An Old Master, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 1995, at Bl (same); see also Carol Vogel, Leonardo Notebook Sells for $30.8 
Million, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1994, at Al (describing a sale by the Annand Hammer Mu-
seum of Art and Cultural Center of one of Leonardo da Vinci's notebooks for purposes of 
raising money to defend a lawsuit). 
The more common - and less publicized - cases are much like the hypothetical de· 
scribed above. See supra text accompanying notes 4-9. In Trustees of Everhart Museum v. 
Commonwealth, No. 1043-92 (C.P. Orphans' Ct. Lackawanna County, Pa. Aug. 25, 1992), the 
support received by the museum from the city and state was reduced by nearly 40%, the 
region was suffering severe economic problems, and the possibility of renewed public funding 
was unlikely. The court found it in the best interest of the museum to sell a Matisse painting 
valued at over four million dollars but reserved its decision regarding the use of the proceeds 
for later. The painting failed to sell; as a result, the court never made this analysis. 
In Holyoke Public Library Corp. v. Shawmut Bank, No. 93-002 (P. & Fam. Ct. Hampden 
County, Mass. Jan. 26, 1993), the court approved the sale of works to an educational institu-
tion and the use of funds for operating expenses. The museum historically had received the 
bulk of its funding from the city, so it suffered when the city cut back on funding. 
Operating exigencies for small and large museums alike include the need to repay bank 
loans and perfonn maintenance, such as improving building conditions and climate-control 
mechanisms. See Hammond Museum, Inc. v. Harshbarger, No. 92E-0067-Gl (P. & Fam. Ct. 
Essex County, Mass. Oct. 5, 1992) (permitting a museum in default of its bank loan to sell 
works to raise money to pay off the loan and to use residual funds to perfonn maintenance). 
16. See, e.g., Trustees of the Everhart Museum, No. 1043-92; Hammond Museum, No. 
92E-0067-Gl. These cases are discussed in Johnston, supra note 13, at 169-74. 
17. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reading Pub. Museum & Art Gallery, No. 72430 (C.P. 
Orphans' Ct. Berks County, Pa. Aug. 15, 1991). This case is discussed in Marie C. Malaro, 
Deaccessioning in Hard Times, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION 25, 29-32 
(A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1992) [hereinafter Deaccessioning in Hard Times]. 
The attorney general is generally the only party with standing to sue a nonprofit organiza-
tion for misuse of its assets. See MARIE c. MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER ON MANAGING MU-
SEUM COLLECTIONS 19-22 (1985) [hereinafter A LEGAL PRIMER]. The attorney general of 
each state has the authority to institute or participate in court proceedings that challenge the 
propriety of a museum's proposed transaction. In most states, the attorney general's power 
and duty of enforcement is codified. Even when no statute exists, the power is generally 
recognized in common law. See id. at 19 n.2; Johnston, supra note 13, at 168. 
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may initiate litigation against the museum directors for mismanage-
ment after a sale of assets.18 Traditionally, the attorney general has 
been designated to protect the public's interest in the administra-
tion of charitable organizations, an interest that most likely would 
go unprotected if individual members of the public were expected 
to perform this role.19 Members of the public may be responsible 
for bringing the matter to the attention of the attorney general, but, 
generally, the public does not have standing to bring an action 
directly. 
Unfortunately for museum directors and attorneys general, 
courts have not decided when deaccessioning for the purpose of 
raising operating revenue is subject to legal challenge.20 Although 
the codes of ethics promulgated by various museum professional 
associations forbid the application of proceeds from deaccessioning 
toward operating expenses,21 at present courts have not indicated 
Attorneys general have an array of other responsibilities in addition to their authority 
over charitable organizations. As a result, their ability to supervise these organizations seems 
to be "greater in theory than in practice." STEPHEN E. WEIL, Breaches of Trust, Remedies, 
and Standards in the American Private Art Museum, in BEAUTY AND THE BEASTS, supra note 
3, at 160, 166-67. 
Attorneys general also encounter difficulty in monitoring the transactions of charitable 
organizations due to the lack of reporting requirements for these organizations. In 1951, the 
National Association of Attorneys General sought to create a uniform act to deal with this 
problem. The Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act was drafted and 
approved by the American Bar Association in 1954. To date, the Act only has been adopted, 
with some modifications, in a handful of states. See A LEGAL PRIMER, supra, at 37-38. The 
Act proposes a register of charities and periodic reports by charitable organizations, both 
open to inspection by the public, and gives attorneys general more power to investigate trans-
actions. See UNJF. SUPERVISION OF TRUSTEES FOR CliARrrABLE PURPOSES Acr § l, 7B 
U.L.A. 727 (1985). These reporting requirements would assist the courts in their evaluations 
of deaccessioning proposals and would reinforce directors' obligation to the public. 
18. See, e.g., People ex reL Scott v. Silverstein, 418 N.E.2d 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Peo-
ple ex rel. Scott v. George F. Harding Museum, 374 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). 
The discussion infra in Part II regarding the standard of conduct for museum directors 
applies to these cases in which liability for Inismanagement is sought. But this Note focuses 
more on the potential behavior of directors in the hopes that directors, attorneys general, and 
courts will work together to protect the public interest before it is harmed. 
The role of the attorney general in deaccessioning controversies depends on the law of 
the state. In some states, the attorney general may require notice of any substantial sale of 
assets by a charitable organization. See, e.g., N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAw § 511 
(McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1995). Even if neither notice to the attorney general nor court 
approval is mandated by law, a director should consider consulting the attorney general prior 
to a sale due to the inflammatory nature of deaccessioning. See A LEGAL PRIMER, supra 
note 17, at 145 & n.18 (recommending early consultation with the attorney general by direc-
tors about deaccessioning decisions). Directors would be wise to seek both attorney-general 
and court approval of a proposed transaction rather than risk liability suits by dissatisfied 
patrons. 
19. See A LEGAL PRIMER, supra note 17, at 19-20. 
20. This lack of guidance by courts only exacerbates the problems that attorneys general 
encounter with oversight of charitable organizations. Without some agreement regarding the 
requisite standard of conduct for trustees, that enforcement power is difficult to wield. See 
WEIL, supra note 17, at 167. 
21. The following codes proscribe this practice: AMERICAN ASSN. FOR STATE AND LOCAL 
HisroRY, STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL Ennes 1 (1992) ("Collections shall not be deacces-
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whether and when this prohibition will be enforced.22 The few 
courts rendering decisions have been silent as to their reasoning,23 
sioned or disposed of in order to provide financial support for institutional operations, facili-
ties maintenance or any reason other than the preservation or acquisition of collections."); 
AMERICAN ASSN. OF MUSEUMS, CODE OF ETincs FOR MUSEUMS 8-9 (1994) ("[D]isposal of 
collections through sale, trade, or research activities is solely for the advancement of the 
museum's mission .... [I]n no event shall [proceeds] be used for anything other than acquisi-
tion or direct care of collections."); ASSOCIATION OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, PROFES-
SIONAL PRACTICES IN ART MUSEUMS app. A (1992) ("The members of the Association of 
Art Museum Directors ... declare that it is unprofessional for museum Directors •.. to 
dispose of accessioned works of art in order to provide funds for purposes other than acquisi-
tions of works of art for the collection."); COLLEGE ART ASSN., RESOLUTION CONCERNING 
THE SALE AND EXCHANGE OF WORKS OF ART BY MUSEUMS 2 (1973) ("[W]orks of art should 
be considered for sale or exchange only for the purpose of expanding or increasing the im-
portance of the collection, not for operating expenses or building funds."); INTERNATIONAL 
COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETinCS 22 (1987) ("Any moneys received 
by a governing body from the disposal of ... works of art should be applied solely for the 
purchase of additions to the museum collections."). The American Association of Museums 
(AAM) and the American Association for State and Local History allow the use of sale 
proceeds for the preservation of works in a museum collection. These organizations should 
note that raising funds to preserve works is comparable to using these funds to preserve the 
museum building itself. See Feldstein, supra note 4, at 8-9. 
22. Codes of ethics generally lack the force of law. The Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct that exist for the legal profession disclaim any force of law. 
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any 
presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The Rules are designed to provide 
guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through discipli-
nary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.0 (1994). In fact, no court explicitly has 
recognized a private cause of action based on a violation of an ethical code. See Criton A. 
Constantinides, Note, Professional Ethics Codes in Court: Redefining the Social Contract 
Between the Public and the Professions, 25 GA. L. REv. 1327, 1355 n.142 (1991). 
The most recent AAM Code of Ethics for Museums requires members of the Association 
to frame their own specific codes of ethics that must conform with the general AAM code. 
These ethical codes must be enacted no later than January 1, 1997. See Ellsworth H. Brown, 
Code of Ethics for Museums, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION, supra note 
17, at 145, 149-50. Although these codes aim to ensure the ethical behavior of member insti· 
tutions and their employees, they legally cannot bind the museum any more than the general 
code can, unless they become part of the corporate bylaws amounting to a binding contract. 
This lack of legal enforceability does not prevent courts from using codes of ethics as the 
basis for establishing standards of care and duties that are legally enforceable. Cf. Post Of· 
fice v. Portee, Inc., 913 F.2d 802, 807 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting in dictum that a code of conduct 
for licensed engineers was admissible as evidence of an industry standard of conduct), va-
cated on other grounds, 935 F.2d 1105 (10th Cir.1991); Woodruffv. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 
(6th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that although the Code of Professional Responsibility is not law, 
it does constitute evidence of the standards required of attorneys); Lipton v. Boesky, 313 
N.W.2d 163, 167 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a violation of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility is rebuttable evidence of attorney malpractice); Saur v. Probes, 476 N.W.2d 
496, 498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (applying the holding of Lipton to a psychiatrist's code of 
responsibility); see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETincs 51-52 (1986). In 
addition, the threat of professional sanctions for association members who fail to abide by 
i:µuseum codes of ethics can serve as a meaningful form of self-regulation. For example, on 
or before January 1, 1997, the Ethics Commission of the AAM will begin reviewing allega-
tions of violations of the 1991 Code of Ethics for Museums by any of its nonprofit museum 
members. The Ethics Commission may recommend to the AAM Executive Committee that 
membership be revoked for any museums violating the code. See Brown, supra, at 150. 
23. There have been relatively few court cases dealing with deaccessioning. Judges tend 
to give one-time orders that do not provide insight into their decisionmaking processes and, 
as a result, offer no direction for future applicability. See, e.g., Holyoke Pub. Library Corp. v. 
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and the bodies of law governing museum actions - corporate law 
and the law of trusts - offer no clear guidance on this matter. If 
museums intend to treat the items in their collections as fungible 
assets to solve their cash flow problems, courts should attempt 
more structured judicial scrutiny that takes into account the best 
interest of the public.24 The development of an analytical frame-
work is particularly important in this area because of the rebuttable 
presumption, created by the museum codes of ethics, that deacces-
sioning to cover operating expenses is unethical behavior.25 
Shawmut Bank, No. 93-002 (P. & Fam. Ct. Hampden County, Mass. Jan. 26, 1993) (issuing no 
opinion, only an equity judgment authorizing the museum "to add the proceeds from the sale 
of a portion of its art collection to its endowment fund with the income to be used for operat-
ing purposes as well as the acquisition of library materials and objects of art"); Hammond 
Museum, Inc. v. Harshbarger, No. 92E-0067-Gl (P. & Fam. Ct. Essex County, Mass. Oct. 5, 
1992) (issuing no opinion, only a judgment stating that the museum was authorized to make 
the sale, to use the proceeds to pay off a bank loan, and, "if residual funds are available, to 
preserve the remaining artifacts of the museum and purchase similar ones, and do repairs, 
maintenance, and to make necessary improvements on the museum's real estate insofar as 
any of these are necessary to keep the museum open and functioning"); Commonwealth v. 
Reading Pub. Museum & Art Gallery, No. 72430 (C.P. Orphans' Ct. Berks County, Pa. Aug. 
15, 1991) (issuing no opinion, only an order granting the preliminary injunction sought by the 
attorney general, which prevented the auction of paintings). 
The one case in which a court made impressive efforts to address the important issues 
never reached the question of the legality of using the sale proceeds for operating expenses. 
See Trustees of Everhart Museum v. Commonwealth, No. 1043-92 (C.P. Orphans' Ct. Lack-
awanna County, Pa. Aug. 25, 1992). The court had delayed its decision on this issue to allow 
more time to consider possible financial planning for the museum but issued a relatively 
lengthy opinion regarding the reasonableness of the proposed sale. The attempts to sell the 
painting were unsuccessful, and the plan was abandoned. 
More illuminating arguments generally come from the attorneys' pleadings and particu-
larly from attorneys' general briefs. These documents often raise the central issue of whether 
a trustee risks acting negligently in carrying out the proposed deaccessioning plan. Unfortu-
nately, the court orders usually fail to comment on the arguments raised in these documents. 
See Attorney General's Brief, Reading Pub. Museum No. 72430; see also Complaint at 4, 
Holyoke Pub. Library Corp. No. 93-002. 
24. See WEIL, supra note 17, at 167. 
The most fundamental characteristic of museums is their public purpose, a quality which 
translates into "charitable purposes" under the law and creates a legal relationship be-
tween museums and the public .... 
The urgency to develop a clearer sense of the law of museum trusteeship remains. 
Ideally, the law provides guidance and predictability in society .... Clarification of the 
fiduciary ethic as applied to museum trusteeship is a crucial element of this process. 
Katz, supra note 10, at 57-58. 
25. This Note argues that a policy as rigorous as the Museum Code of Ethics does not 
serve the best interests of the public. This Note encourages museum organizations to recon-
sider the present needs of museums and the public rather than stigmatizing museums that 
seek this option as a means to serve their beneficiaries and fulfill their fiduciary obligations. 
As codes of ethics now read ... there is no acknowledgement that instances can arise 
where boards might prudently determine that their beneficiaries are better served if col-
lection objects are sold and proceeds are used for other than collection purposes. This 
means that a board can be placed in a situation where it is scrupulously following its 
legal responsibilities and exercising in good faith an informed judgement and its actions 
can be labelled "unethical." 
Deaccessioning in Hard Tunes, supra note 17, at 33. 
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Contrary to the view adopted by current codes of ethics, this 
Note argues that courts should approve a museum director's use of 
proceeds from the sale of deaccessioned art to meet operating ex-
penses if the director's conduct comports with the duties of trustees 
under the law of trusts. Part I explores possible organizational 
structures for museums, including the charitable trust and the non-
profit corporation. Part I also compares the fiduciary duties of mu-
seum managers under trust and corporate law. Part II argues that 
courts should apply trust-law principles both to trustees of charita-
ble trusts and directors of charitable corporations26 because these 
managers perform the same role regardless of the organizational 
form of the museum entity and because the public's interest in the 
museum's assets necessitates a heightened fiduciary duty. Part III 
explains how courts can apply the duties of trust law - namely, 
loyalty and care - to the legality of a museum director's proposed 
deaccessioning plan.27 This Note concludes that, by evaluating 
deaccessioning plans based on their consistency with the fiduciary 
duties of trustees, courts best can serve the interests of a museum's 
intended beneficiaries, the public. 
I. THE LAW GOVERNING MUSEUM ACTIVITIES 
Museums traditionally have been formed as either nonprofit 
corporations or charitable trusts.28 The directors of for-profit cor-
porations, while fulfilling duties similar to those of trustees, gener-
ally are held to a lower standard of care.29 Courts have experienced 
difficulty, however, developing criteria to evaluate deaccessioning 
proposals because the legal standard of care required of nonprofit 
directors remains unclear. Courts have not established whether the 
conduct of nonprofit directors will be controlled by the form of the 
organization, either corporate or trust, or whether all nonprofit di-
rectors will be treated similarly regardless of form. This situation 
has led to much confusion and little consistency.3o Accordingly, 
section I.A briefly introduces the technical forms a museum may 
take - the charitable trust and the nonprofit corporation. Section 
I.B compares the standards of conduct required of fiduciaries under 
the law of trusts and corporate law. 
26. This Note uses the term "charitable corporation" interchangeably with "nonprofit 
corporation." 
27. For the sake of simplicity, this Note refers to deaccessioning for the purpose of meet-
ing operating expenses as merely "deaccessioning," except when necessary to distinguish the 
purposes of deaccessioning. 
28. See MARILYN PHELAN, MUSEUMS AND THE LAW 1-7 {1982). 
29. See Note, The Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and Care Associated with the Directors and 
Trustees of Charitable Organizations, 64 VA. L. REv. 449, 451-54 {1978). 
30. See Katz, supra note 10, at 66-67 (noting that applying fiduciary standards to muse-
ums is difficult because museums are not organized uniformly). 
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A. The Legal Form of the Museum 
Because of their common purposes, museums have similar 
problems regardless of their organizational structure. It is never-
theless important to note the structural possibilities and manage-
ment dilemmas that stem from the existence of varying standards of 
conduct for the same type of enterprise. 
1. The Charitable Trust 
A trust originates from an arrangement, either inter vivos31 or 
by will, that creates a "fiduciary relationship with respect to prop-
erty, subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is held 
to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of an-
other."32 A trust can be viewed as a property arrangement under 
which ownership of the property is divided between the parties in-
volved. The creator of the trust designates a trustee33 who obtains 
legal title to the trust property.34 The beneficiary of the trust holds 
the equitable or beneficial title.3s 
A charitable trust is one of several special types of trust36 - if a 
museum is established in the form of a trust, it will be a charitable 
trust.37 A charitable trust differs from a private trust in that a chari-
table trust must "accomplish a substantial amount of social benefit 
to the public or some reasonably large class thereof."38 As a result, 
it may enjoy tax privileges not bestowed upon the private trust. 
2. The Nonprofit Corporation 
Like the charitable trust, the nonprofit corporation serves the 
general purpose of providing a social benefit to the public and, as a 
31. An inter vivas trust is created by the settler during his lifetime, as opposed to at his 
death. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 17 (1957). 
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 2 (1957). 
33. In the case of an inter vivas trust, the settler of the trust may name himself as trustee, 
or he may name a third party. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 17(a)-(b) (1957). 
34. See PHELAN, supra note 28, at 1-2. Legal title does not grant the trustee any benefi-
cial property interest; the trustee holds title only as a "representative." For example, per-
sonal creditors of the trustee have no claim to the trust property. See BOGERT, supra note 7, 
§ 32. 
35. See PHELAN, supra note 28, at 1-2. Beneficial title empowers the beneficiaries to 
enforce the trust because the beneficiaries are "equitably entitled to its advantages." 
BOGERT, supra note 7, § 1. In the case of a charitable trust, the power of enforcement rests 
with the attorney general as "representative of the public." Id. § 156. For an example of a 
trust instrument that would create a museum as a charitable trust, see PHELAN, supra note 28, 
at 169-72. 
36. See LoRING, A TRuSTEE's HANDBOOK 229 (Charles E. Rounds, Jr. & Eric P. Hayes 
eds., 7th ed. 1994). 
37. See PHELAN, supra note 28, at 2. 
38. BoGERT, supra note 7, § 54. 
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result, also may be entitled to tax benefits.39 The two forms differ 
in that the founders of a nonprofit corporation achieve corporate 
status by filing articles of incorporation with the state.4o A board of 
directors is elected to manage a nonprofit corporation in accord-
ance with the charter and bylaws of the corporatioiJ.,41 as opposed 
to a charitable trust, which is administered by a trustee in accord-
ance with the trust instrument. 
Most states have statutes governing nonprofit corporations.42 
These statutes establish requirements pertaining to internal proce-
dures of the organization43 but generally do not impose a standard 
of conduct for directors.44 Most art museums choose to incorporate 
under these nonprofit statutes.45 By incorporating, museums enjoy 
the benefits that the corporate form offers, notably that the direc-
tors are free from personal liability for contracts entered into on 
behalf of the corporation, tort actions against the corporation, and 
actions involving corporate property, because the corporation is a 
legal entity separate from its members.46 The corporate form also 
provides for a continuity of existence that allows a corporation to 
function perpetually, regardless of changes in membership.47 These 
benefits are the same whether the organization functions as a for-
profit or nonprofit corporation. 
The nonprofit corporation does lack one distinguishing factor of 
the for-profit corporation: the profit motive.48 As a result, the 
charitable corporation, like the charitable trust, does not have 
39. See OLECK & STEWART, supra note 14, at 16, 25, 276-87. 
40. See PHELAN, supra note 28, at 4. For an example of articles of incorporation that 
would serve to establish a museum, see id. at 172-73. 
41. See id. at 4. 
42. See Thomas H. Boyd, Note, A Call to Reform the Duties of Directors Under State Not-
For-Profit Corporation Statutes, 72 lowA L. REv. 725, 735 {1987). 
43. For example, the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act, D.C. CooE ANN. 
§§ 29-501 to -599.16 (1991 & Supp. 1995), includes provisions, among others, on meetings of 
members, the appointment and removal of officers, the filing of articles of incorporation, 
procedures for merger or consolidation, and liquidation proceedings. 
44. See Boyd, supra note 42, at 736; infra section 11.B. 
45. See A LEGAL PRIMER, supra note 17, at 4 n.5; WEIL, supra note 17, at 164-65. 
46. See PHELAN, supra note 28, at 3-4. This exemption from personal liability does not 
extend to violations based on the fiduciary relationship between the director and the organi-
zation. See id. at 4. 
Trustees, on the other hand, may be personally liable in contract, tort, and property ac-
tions. "If a trustee makes a contract in the administration of the trust, he is personally liable 
unless the contract provides otherwise." BOGERT, supra note 7, § 125. The trustee is person-
ally accountable for tort liability, with some exceptions for charitable organizations. See id. 
§ 129. "The trustee's liabilities arising solely because of holding title to trust property are the 
same as if he owned the property absolutely." Id. § 132. 
47. See OLECK & STEWART, supra note 14, at 33-34. 
48. See Note, supra note 29, at 456. The charitable corporation does not exist for the 
purpose of making profits to be distributed to shareholders; in fact, the nonprofit corporation 
is forbidden from distributing any profits. See id. at 455 n.38. 
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shareholders or any specific beneficiaries who can assist in monitor-
ing the administration of the corporation. In their voting powers, 
for-profit corporate shareholders have a tool for controlling mana-
gerial behavior; shareholders will not allow directors to avoid ac-
countability for negligent or disloyal acts. Museums or nonprofit 
corporations, on the other hand, serve the broad public, which can-
not exert effective managerial control or supervision.49 The over-
sight of the attorney general is intended to compensate to some 
extent for the absence of shareholders.so 
B. Fiduciary Duties Under Trust and Corporate Law 
The legal structure of a museum - whether a charitable trust or 
nonprofit corporation - may determine the applicable standard of 
fiduciary duty. There are two standards of fiduciary duty courts 
currently can apply to directors: the trustee standard and the for-
profit corporate standard. Which level of duty should be required 
of nonprofit corporate directors is unclear under current law;· 
neither standard is consistently advanced by courts or 
commentators. 
The fiduciary duties of both trustees and directors include the 
duty of loyalty and the duty of care. Furthermore, both trustees 
and directors fulfill these duties in light of a fiduciary relationship 
with the public; they must "act primarily for another's benefit in 
matters connected with [the management of the museum]."51 The 
:fiduciary duties of a trustee do not differ in kind from those of a 
for-profit corporate director, but the trustee is expected to satisfy a 
higher standard with respect to both duties.52 This section describes 
49. See Boyd, supra note 42, at 742. In particular, a public-benefit corporation, which is 
fonned for the benefit of a general segment of the public - as compared to a mutual-benefit 
corporation which typically is created and funded by the specific individuals who are the 
primary beneficiaries of the service provided, such as a trade association or social organiza-
tion - lacks a defined body of members who may deter director misconduct. A museum is 
one example of a public benefit institution. See id. at 726-27, 729-31; see also James J. 
Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34 
EMORY L.J. 617, 675, 677 (1985). 
The difficulty of monitoring the behavior of public-benefit corporations or public trusts is 
a classic collective-action problem. The benefit of a properly run museum to any individual is 
minuscule in comparison to the cost required to monitor or correct director behavior. Propo-
nents of the collective-action theory assert that even in a for-profit corporation, the profit 
motive does not assure that shareholders in a large corporation will take actions to protect 
their economic interest The income of the corporation is a collective good in which each 
shareholder will benefit only minutely. See MANCUR OLSON, THE Lome OF CoLLECI1VE 
AcrioN 55 (1971). The collective-action problem increases when the group involved is even 
less organized - the general public - and any individual incentive is based on intangible 
social benefits rather than economic reward. 
50. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text 
51. BLACK'S LAW DicrIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990); see also Gerstenblith, supra note 14, at 
180 ("A trustee's fiduciary obligations are those duties which the trustee owes to both the 
beneficiaries and the trust."). 
52. See Note, supra note 29, at 451-54. 
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the duties of loyalty and care and explains how these duties are 
more stringent for trustees than for directors of corporations. 
1. The Duty of Loyalty 
The trustee standard of loyalty requires the trustee to "adminis-
ter the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries," which is the 
general public in the case of a charitable trust.S3 The trustee must 
display complete loyalty to the interests of the public. For example, 
trustees are barred from engaging in any "interested transaction" 
- any transaction between the trustee and the organization - be-
cause a trustee cannot avoid breaching the duty of loyalty in a case 
of "self dealing,"s4 regardless of whether the transaction was fair or 
any actual harm was done to the beneficiaries.ss 
In comparison, the corporate director can fulfill his fiduciary ob-
ligations of loyalty by dealing fairly with the corporation.s6 Corpo-
rate law does not demand that the corporate director be as 
completely loyal as trust law requires. For example, interested 
transactions are usually acceptable if the director can prove that the 
interested transaction was intrinsically fair to the corporation.s1 
2. The Duty of Care 
The duty of care encompasses a trustee's or director's exercise 
of care and diligence in managing the trust or corporation.ss In the 
museum context, the duty of care refers to management of the mu-
53. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 170 (1990); see also GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT 
& GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543, at 217 (rep!. vol. 
1993) ("Perhaps the most fundamental duty of a trustee is that he must display throughout 
the administration of the trust complete loyalty to the interests of the beneficiary •.•• "). The 
same duties are required of both trustees of charitable trusts and trustees of private trusts. 
See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS§ 379 (1990). 
54. "Self dealing" includes transactions between the organization and the trustee individ-
ually and transactions between the organization and any enterprise in which the trustee has a 
substantial pecuniary interest. See Note, supra note 29, at 451 n.13. 
55. See In re Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., 103 N.E.2d 721, 725-26 (N.Y. 1952) (find-
ing, in a case involving a trustee's alleged breach of the duty of loyalty, that "the question of 
bad faith or damage is irrelevant to [the] inquiry" because the rule of undivided loyalty is one 
of "uncompromising rigidity"); BoGERT & BOGERT, supra note 53, at 227-28 (discussing pub-
lic policy reasons for the strict trustee duty-of-loyalty standard). 
56. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALY· 
SIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.01, at 205-08 (1994). 
57. See Murphy v. Washington Am. League Base Ball Club, Inc., 324 F.2d 394, 396 (D.C. 
Cir. 1963); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403-05 (Del. 1987); Johnston v. Greene, 121 
A.2d 919, 925 (Del. 1956); HARRY G. HENN & JoHN R. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORA· 
TIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 238 (3d ed. 1983); see also AMERICAN LAW IN-
STITUTE, supra note 56, at 235. Most states have codified this standard in "safe-harbor" 
statutes. See id. at 235-41. 
58. See Daniel L. Kurtz, Safeguarding the Mission: The Duties and Liabilities of Officers 
and Directors, in NOT·FOR·PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 17, 25-26 (A.L.1.-A.B.A. 1992); see also 
Gerstenblith, supra note 14, at 193. 
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seum's assets, including not only proper management of trust funds 
but also due care for the museum's collection.59 
The trustee standard of care requires trustees to exercise the 
care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in dealing 
with his own property.6° For example, a trustee is expected to in-
vest trust funds to produce a steady flow of income and to preserve 
the trust principal; a trustee may not endanger the corpus of the 
trust through speculative investments.61 The trustee must act 
within a specified range of suitable investments, and the law will 
closely scrutinize the trustee for deviations from this range that 
might be considered negligent.62 
The duty of care for a corporate director is phrased similarly,63 
yet the courts allow corporate directors a much wider range of dis-
cretion. 64 The corporate "business-judgment rule" permits direc-
tors to use their own judgment and excuses simple errors.65 Under 
the business-judgment rule, courts will find liability only when di-
rectors commit "gross negligence" rather than "simple negli-
gence."66 Consequently, the corporate director need not be as risk-
averse as the trustee in investments.67 In the business world, risk 
often corresponds with profit potential. Corporate law does not 
aim to curb this risk taking unless directors are grossly negligent -
59. See Gerstenblith, supra note 14, at 193-95. Several duties relevant to deaccessioning 
fall within this general category of duty of care, including the duty to protect and preserve 
trust property and the duty to make trust property productive. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS§ 176 (1959); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD} OF TRUSTS§ 181 (1990); BOGERT, 
supra note 7, §§ 99, 101. 
60. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ThuSTS § 174 (1959). 
61. See BOGERT, supra note 7, § 106. 
62. See id. § 104. 
63. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981}, enunciates the basic 
corporate-law standard of the duty of care. According to Francis, directors and officers must 
"discharge their duties in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which 
ordinarily prudent [persons] would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions." 
432 A.2d at 820. 
64. See Note, supra note 29, at 453. 
65. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 57, at 661-63. 
66. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
67. See Note, supra note 29, at 454; see also Dennis J. Block et al., The Business Judge-
ment Rule in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, in 3 26TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES 
REGULATION 689, 697 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-868, 1994) 
("[The business-judgment] rule recognizes that business decisions frequently entail risk, and 
thus provides directors the broad discretion they need to formulate dynamic and effective 
company policy without fear of judicial second-guessing."). On the other hand: 
In performing his investment duties a trustee should consider the purposes of the 
trust, which are normally the production of a constant flow of income consistent with 
maintenance of the safety of the principal of the fund, and the preservation of the princi-
pal of the trust. He has no duty to make investments for the purpose of increasing the 
value of the trust assets. 
BOGERT, supra note 7, § 106. 
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for example, by failing to make reasonable investigation into the 
subject of their business decision or sacrificing the best interests of 
the corporation and the shareholders. 68 
II. THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD THAT CONTROLS THE CONDUCT 
OF MUSEUM DIRECTORS 
Courts have had difficulty in developing standards by which to 
evaluate deaccessioning decisions because museums can take either 
of two legal forms - a charitable trust or a nonprofit corporation. 
While trust managers are always held to the trustee standard, this 
formal distinction raises the question of which standard of conduct 
should be applied to directors of museums that take the nonprofit 
corporate form, the predominant form for museums. 
This Part argues that courts should employ trust principles in 
evaluating deaccessioning decisions made by museums, whether 
these museums are structured as charitable trusts or nonprofit cor-
porations. Section II.A argues that for purposes of determining the 
fiduciary obligations of museum directors, courts should apply 
charitable-trust principles to both trustees and directors because 
they perform similar roles, and their respective organizations have 
identical purposes. Section II.B contends that despite some of the 
organizational differences between trusts and nonprofit corpora-
tions, these differences should not affect the standard of fiduciary 
duty applied to museum directors. 
A. Nonprofit Directors and the Trustee Standard 
Because the law of nonprofit corporations has not developed to 
the point of establishing a standard of conduct applicable in all 
cases, courts are currently free to apply either the trust or corporate 
standard to director conduct.69 Evaluating the conduct of museum 
directors in dissimilar ways based merely upon differences in orga-
nizational form improperly elevates form over function because the 
choice of organizational form has no affect on the service that mu-
seums provide to the public. Whether a museum is organized as a 
68. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874 (holding that a board of directors acted in a grossly 
negligent manner in granting uninformed approval of a merger proposal). 
69. See A LEGAL PRIMER, supra note 17, at 13-16; Developments in the Law - Nonprofit 
Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1579, 1593 (1992). In states where a standard is established 
by statute, courts do not have this freedom. 
Even if the stricter trust standard were rejected in favor of the corporate standard, the 
test developed in Part III of this Note for analyzing proposed deaccessioning decisions still 
would be applicable. In all cases, a nonprofit director must manage the museum for the 
benefit of the public. Though a higher fiduciary standard would serve as a better guide for 
both directors and courts, in practice, both the trust and corporate standards are sufficiently 
vague to require courts to decide each fiduciary duty case on its particular facts. See OLECK 
& STEWART, supra note 14, at 899. The test advocated in this Note recognizes the impor-
tance of the individual factual circumstances in deaccessioning cases. See infra Part III. 
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trust or as a corporation, the public requires it to protect and pre-
serve cultural assets.10 
The societal interest in the beneficial administration of charita-
ble organizations requires the application of a more demanding fi-
duciary standard. Museums preserve an institution and collection 
of assets so highly esteemed that they have been dedicated to public 
use and enjoyment. Yet the general public, as compared with the 
shareholders of a for-profit corporation, cannot monitor and con-
trol effectively the conduct of museum directors.71 The problem of 
collective action prevents any concerted action; the costs of organiz-
ing the public as a whole are prohibitively high, and individual 
members generally will not assume this responsibility or expense 
while others enjoy the benefits of their efforts without participating. 
The presence of potential free riders generally will dissuade mem-
bers of the public from attempting individual action. As a result, 
individuals will fail to take action that would serve the collective 
good - they will hold out in the hopes that other individuals will 
bear the burden.72 For this reason, one commentator suggests that 
"[i]f a board of directors has no membership to police its actions, 
enforcement of a trustee standard would provide a necessary 
substitute. "73 
Moreover, the managers of a museum formed as a charitable 
corporation are just as much trustees as are managers who are for-
mally named as the trustees of a charitable trust.74 Because a mu-
seum formed as a nonprofit corporation usually is maintained by 
70. "Society has an interest in the proper administration of charities, and this interest is 
the same regardless of organizational form." Fishman, supra note 49, at 677. The Second 
Restatement of Trusts instructs that "the principles and rules applicable to charitable trusts 
are applicable to charitable corporations." REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f 
(1959). 
Structure may seem to obfuscate the common law, and indeed it has in certain courts. 
But if an organization declares itself to be eleemosynary, or charitable (that is, operating 
with the sole purpose of serving the public good ... ), its organizational structure makes 
no fundamental difference in its legal accountability to use its resources, to manage 
property, and to exercise its stated purpose in its charter and bylaws for the interests of 
the public and no other. 
JAMES c. BAUG1™AN, TRUsrEES, TRUsrEESHIP, AND THE PUBLIC Gooo: ISSUES OF Ac. 
COUNTABILITY FOR HOSPITALS, MUSEUMS, UNIVERSrnES, AND LIBRARIES 19 (1987); see also 
Note, supra note 29, at 456-57 (collecting commentators who support the proposition that 
"[t]he standards of liability for the fiduciaries of charities should not differ for organizations 
with the same goals and purposes"). 
71. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
72. See supra note 49. 
73. Boyd, supra note 42, at 742; see also Katz, supra note 10, at 72-73 (explaining that the 
general public has "little or no voice in selecting the management" of museums and therefore 
the stricter trustee standard is necessary to protect the public interest). 
74. See Gerstenblith, supra note 14, at 176-77; see also Katz, supra note 10, at 72-73 (con-
cluding that because "museums are entrusted with assets for the benefit" of the public, they 
resemble trusts more closely than corporations). 
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public donations of artwork and funds,75 courts have considered 
these assets to be held in trust and have required managers to ad-
minister these assets in accordance with the organization's mis-
sion.76 Under this approach, the directors are subject to the 
fiduciary duties required of a trustee. The museum collection is es-
sentially a trust asset, strongly supporting the application of a 
trustee standard of fiduciary duty to museum managers regardless 
of the museum's corporate form. Given that museum directors are 
trustees for the art in the museum collection, they should be held to 
the level of fiduciary duty required of trustees, even if the museum 
is organized as a nonprofit corporation.77 
The trustee standard of fiduciary duty also has the virtue of pro-
viding explicit standards that address society's interest in the ad-
ministration of both charitable trusts and charitable corporations. 
For example, trustees are given a clear mandate to protect and pre-
serve trust property and to make trust property productive.1s These 
specific duties provide extra guidance for directors who may not be 
professional managers. In addition, bright-line rules, such as the 
absolute prohibition against self dealing for trustees, offer discern-
ible direction because they are not based on vague notions of fair-
ness. The charitable corporation has proliferated in relatively 
recent years, presenting a conundrum for lawmakers due to its hy-
brid form.79 A well-articulated standard provides much more guid-
ance for directors than the general corporate-law obligations. 
75. See Gerstenblith, supra note 14, at 176. 
76. See American Qr. for Educ. v. Cavnar, 145 Cal. Rptr. 736, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
Cavnar states that 
gifts to charitable corporations are deemed given in trust to carry out the objects of the 
corporation, and the assets of charitable corporations are deemed to be impressed with a 
charitable trust by virtue of the declaration of corporate purposes. Accordingly, charita-
ble corporations are generally governed by the same rules as those applicable to charita-
ble trusts. 
145 Cal. Rptr. at 742 (citations omitted); see also Lynch v. John M. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. 
Rptr. 86, 89 (Cal. a. App. 1970) ("Assets of a charitable corporation are impressed with a 
trust. Members of the board of directors of such corporation are essentially trustees." (cita-
tions omitted)); Boyd, supra note 42, at 734 ("Because not-for-profit corporations receive 
their funding on the condition that it will be used toward the efficient accomplishment of the 
corporations' missions, the donations effectively form trusts."). 
77. See Katz, supra note 10, at 72-73. Even if courts were to determine that nonprofit 
directors generally are to be held to the lower standard of conduct, museum directors should 
be treated differently due to the special trust status of the assets for which they are responsi-
ble. Unlike most other nonprofit organizations, a museum's activity revolves around the 
holding of particular assets with exceptional value for the benefit of the public. 
78. See Gerstenblith, supra note 14, at 193. 
79. See MARILYN PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: LAW AND TAXATION iii (1985) 
("While the growth of nonprofit organizations has been phenomenal in recent years, the laws 
relating to these organizations have not always kept pace."). 
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B. The Corporate Form and Substantive Duties 
Some commentators have argued that the charitable corpora-
tion resembles the business corporation in its structure and some 
aspects of governance and, therefore, that directors of nonprofit 
corporations must be governed by the corporate-director standard 
of fiduciary duty.80 Nonprofit corporation statutes, which have de-
veloped in virtually all states, include some provisions modeled af-
ter preexisting for-profit statutes. For example, the 1987 Revised 
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMNCA) borrows relevant 
language directly from the Model Business Corporation Act.81 The 
RMNCA claims to "settle[] the dispute as to whether directors of 
nonprofit corporations should meet the general business standards 
or the trustee standards" by proposing that directors be governed 
exclusively by the lower corporate standards.82 
The argument that directors' fiduciary duties from for-profit 
corporate law must be applied in nonprofit settings fails, however, 
because most nonprofit statutes do not include a provision estab-
lishing a standard of conduct for directors.83 Instead, these statutes 
only address procedural issues that are related to the corporate 
structure.84 Therefore, in the majority of cases, it is perfectly con-
80. These commentators have observed that both types of corporation are created by 
incorporating under state law, meaning that the law grants each the same corporate treat-
ment, for example, status as a legal entity distinct from its constituent members and freedom 
from personal liability for individual directors. See Note, supra note 29, at 455. Other sup-
porters of the more lax corporate standard suggest that the nonprofit director may face re-
sponsibilities that more closely resemble those faced by the corporate director than those of 
the common law trustee. The responsibilities of a museum director include deaccessioning 
decisions, as well as acquisitions, maintenance of the physical plant, storage, cataloguing, 
deficit spending, and hiring and supervising personnel. Historically, the common law trustee 
concentrated on managing investments. See Gordon H. Marsh, Governance of Non-Profit 
Organizations: An Appropriate Standard of Conduct for Trustees and Directors of Museums 
and Other Cultural Institutions, 85 DICK. L. REv. 607, 622 (1981). Perhaps this distinction is 
becoming more prehistoric than historic. The modem trustee is more than just a money 
manager in the sense of making prudent investments and distributing income to beneficiaries. 
The management of trust assets always will be central to the trustee's obligations, but "man-
agement" and "assets" can take on a very expansive meaning, as should be apparent from the 
context of deaccessioning by art museums. 
81. Compare REVISED MoDELBusINESs CoRP. Acr § 8.30(a)-(d) (1984) with REVISED 
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Acr § 8.30(a)-(d) (1987). The Committee on Corporate Laws 
decided to revise the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) during the period that the 
Subcommittee on the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act was working on the revised Act. 
The Subcommittee decided to "track the MBCA in form and substance whenever appropri-
ate, particularly in regard to filings with the secretary of state, formation of corporations, 
corporate powers, qualification of foreign corporations, requirements for a corporate office 
and agent and procedures for merger and dissolution." Michael C. Hone, Introduction to 
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CoRP. Acr (1987). The Subcommittee appears to have been 
concerned primarily with Inimicking sections relating to the organizational aspects of the 
corporation. 
82. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CoRP. Acr § 8.30 cmt. (1987). 
83. See Boyd, supra note 42, at 736-38. In fact, the 1987 RMNCA was the first version of 
the MNCA to deal with standards of care and loyalty for nonprofit directors. 
84. See Note, supra note 29, at 455; supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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sistent for courts to enforce nonprofit corporation statutes that ap-
ply corporate principles to the internal procedures of museums, 
such as establishing procedures for filing with the Secretary of State 
or creating bylaws, but to apply trust law principles to the fiduciary 
responsibilities of the museum directors.ss 
Deaccessioning decisions, for example, would not come within 
the scope of merely procedural aspects of corporate governance, 
appropriately analyzed under corporate-law standards. The deci-
sion to sell works of art from a museum collection is a sensitive one 
that requires the utmost care and loyalty; this obligation is of a dif-
ferent nature than that of setting procedures for amending bylaws 
or other similar activities. Moreover, this decisionmaking process 
needs to be equally thorough and prudent regardless of the formal 
structure of the museum - the museum's obligation to the public is 
of paramount importance in such a decision. 
III. THE FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING A PROPOSED 
DEACCESSIONING TRANSACTION 
Because museums serve the same purpose regardless of their 
form of organization, courts should evaluate the proposed deacces-
sioning transactions of museum directors using the principles and 
interests enunciated by the trust-law fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty. As discussed in Part I, the trustee standard of loyalty re-
quires complete loyalty to the interests of the beneficiaries - the 
public.86 In addition, that standard of care requires trustees to 
manage museum assets held for the public good diligently and 
under risk-averse policies.87 In the context of deaccessioning, these 
duties lead to the same conclusion - courts can approve transac-
tions that serve the public interest and need not differentiate be-
tween potential violations of the duties of loyalty and care. While 
self dealing is not the focus of concern in deaccessioning cases, the 
underlying requirement of unfailing loyalty to the beneficiaries re-
85. See A LEGAL PRIMER, supra note 17, at 17 & n.51; Fishman, supra note 49, at 676; see 
also City of Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 235 A.2d 487, 489 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1967) ("To some extent [the law applicable to charitable corporations] has its roots in the law 
of trusts, to some extent in the law of corporations; to some extent it may panake of both or 
indeed be sui generis. "). 
86. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
87. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. A duty of primary importance for a 
trustee is the duty to make the trust property productive through suitable investments. See 
REsTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 181, 379 (1990). In evaluating a proposal for deacces-
sioning, the court should look over financial records provided by the directors regarding their 
investments and budget. If the court discovers a pattern of financial activities that violates 
the duty of care, the court has at its disposal a variety of remedies, such as removing the 
directors from their position. Directors cannot expect to neglect their duty to invest with 
care and then make up for losses by selling off the collection. By allowing this result, the 
courts would transform a temporary, emergency solution into a permanent crutch. 
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mains relevant. The duty of care requires the trustee to manage 
trust assets in the interest of the beneficiaries. For museums, the 
beneficiary of the art held in trust is the public. Thus, in applying 
the trustee standard of loyalty and care to deaccessioning, courts 
primarily must consider the public interest. 
This Part argues that courts should evaluate any proposed trans-
action under a three-prong test. First, courts must look at whether 
the museum has a legitimate need for the proceeds from deacces-
sioning and whether the planned use for the deaccessioning pro-
ceeds is consistent with the public interest. If the court is not 
satisfied that this is the case, the court should reject the transaction. 
Next, the court must examine whether an actual sale is required to 
raise the necessary funds. If the court is not persuaded that the 
directors have considered less drastic alternatives, then the court 
should instruct the directors to consider other options and seek 
court approval at a later date. If the court is convinced that no 
alternatives to sale are viable, then the court would move on to the 
third prong· of the test. In this part, the court should take into ac-
count the intended buyer. Sale of the work to another nonprofit 
organization that will make the work accessible to the public should 
lead to court approval of the sale as long as the directors are not 
obtaining a substantially lower price by selling to this organization. 
If the intended buyer is a private individual or entity, the court still 
may approve the sale if the price is significantly higher than that 
offered by a public institution.ss 
Section III.A examines the first prong of the test, the need for 
and intended use of the proceeds from deaccessioning. Section 
III.B illustrates the second prong, the consideration of nonsale al-
ternatives. Finally, section III.C looks at the third prong of the test, 
the nature of the intended buyer. 
A. The Legitimate Need for the Deaccessioning Proceeds 
Under this prong of the test, the court must decide whether the 
use of deaccessioning proceeds for operating expenses is consistent 
with the museum's purpose of benefiting the public. The trustee 
has an obligation to demonstrate ultimate loyalty to the public ben-
eficiaries - that he has their best interest in mind - by proving 
that the museum genuinely needs the funds and that the intended 
88. If there is no potential public buyer involved, then the court must find that the private 
buyer's price is high enough to justify the removal of the work from the public domain. 
If the proposed sale is to take place at public auction, where the ultimate buyer is un-
known, the court can approve a sale at auction contingent on its conforming to the require-
ments of a public or private sale. Courts could assure this conformity by requiring judicial 
approval before any auction sale is finalized. In addition, courts could work with the attor-
ney general and seller institutions to implement a "preemption agreement." See infra notes 
111-13 and accompanying text. 
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use of the proceeds upholds the public purpose expressed in the 
charitable-trust indenture or corporate charter. This concept of 
public purpose is not translated easily into specific actions. Because 
no collection can be displayed publicly in a museum with inade-
quate maintenance, the public interest is served if public enjoyment 
of the museum is enhanced or if the remaining works receive 
greater protection as a result of renovation projects. In fact, failing 
to take care of maintenance and other operating expenses could 
threaten the very public purpose served by the establishment of a 
museum and collection in the first place and could be viewed as a 
violation of duty.89 As long as revenue is directed back to a public 
good in some form, whether this good comes in the form of building 
restoration, extended hours for the museum, or another public ben-
efit, the deaccessioning has served the requisite public purpose.90 
B. Consideration of Nonsale Alternatives 
After the court is satisfied that the use of the proceeds would 
benefit the public interest, the court still must consider whether this 
purpose could be served without selling the artwork,91 The first 
consideration for courts is whether the museum has in place an ade-
quate deaccessioning procedure. In establishing precedent on deac-
cessioning the courts have an interest in encouraging museum 
directors to develop internal policies for the deaccessioning process 
- including the consideration of nonsale alternatives - such as 
procedures for the selection of objects suitable for deaccessioning 
and principles regarding the use of proceeds from these sales.92 
Any procedure adopted by the directors as part of the museum's 
bylaws would have the force of law, as long as the policy did not 
89. See Feldstein, supra note 4, at 9 (suggesting that the preservation of works may be 
"socially more productive" than using funds to acquire more art and that funds spent on 
improving the security or the internal climate of a museum are similar in this respect); see 
also BOGERT, supra note 7, § 99 (noting that a trustee has a duty to make such repairs to 
buildings located on trust realty as are necessary to prevent deterioration). 
90. Courts will have to make a case-by-case analysis of whether an intended use is per-
missible. As a general class of uses, operating expenses may provide a social good and are 
therefore acceptable under this test. In a particular situation, a court still might find that the 
intended use cannot be approved. 
91. While this Note does argue that deaccessioning is an acceptable option under certain 
conditions, the courts should seek to make the sale of museum assets a last resort. See A 
LEGAL PRIMER, supra note 17, at 139-40 ("Deaccessioning for routine operating expenses 
normally would be undertaken only as a last resort and only when it appears that the pro-
ceeds of the anticipated sales would enable the museum to regain financial stability."). This 
second prong of the test assures that deaccessioning will not be approved without due consid-
eration of other options. 
92. See Deaccessioning in Hard Times, supra note 17, at 34 ("[T]he public's interests are 
probably best served when boards are on notice that they are expected to be able to demon-
strate that their decisions concerning the management of collections are the result of 
thoughtful and thorough evaluation of all circumstances."). 
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violate the museum's responsibility to the public.93 Several muse-
ums have introduced resolutions on deaccessioning methods, 
although these procedures do not recognize the possibility of deac-
cessioning to raise operating funds. 
Most memorably, the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New 
York modified its deaccessioning and disposal procedures after a 
much criticized transaction in 1972.94 The museum's plan intro-
duced specific steps, including an initial recommendation by a cura-
tor of the deaccessioning of a work of art; the determination, with 
the advice of counsel, as to any legal restrictions on disposal; con-
sideration of the proposal by a committee made up of board mem-
bers; and, after a final decision to deaccession an object, 
notification to the attorney general prior to sale or exchange.95 Mu-
seum directors who alert the attorney general to their planned 
transaction and present proof to the court that they have followed a 
rigorous procedure, such as that of the Metropolitan, will gain cred-
ibility, if not a presumption in their favor that the transaction 
should be approved. 
To analyze museum deaccessioning proposals, courts should 
look for alternatives preferable to sale. One commonly overlooked 
option is a museum's potential to meet operating expenses entirely 
or partially by fundraising.96 Museum directors are often specially 
selected for their financial connections and ability to elicit dona-
tions from members of the public and corporate supporters. Direc-
tors are always encouraged to propose alternatives that have the 
support of the community in a way that deaccessioning may not, 
and imaginative fundraising methods have this potential.97 
93. Bylaws, unlike ethical codes, are binding on directors as long as they do not conflict 
with law or public policy - in effect, they are "internal laws." See OLECK & STEW ART, supra 
note 14, at 693. The primary law of a nonprofit corporation is the charter or articles of 
incorporation. See id. at 701. Accordingly, it would behoove museums to state their deacces-
sioning policy in their charter or bylaws. See Denckla v. Independence Found., 181 A.2d 78, 
83 (Del. Ch. 1962) ("If the power to make the contested grant is either expressly or by neces-
sary implication given by its charter then it matters not whether trust law or corporate law is 
applicable."), affd., 193 A.2d 538 (Del. 1963). 
94. The Metropolitan Museum deaccessioned paintings that had been donated by 
Adelaide Milton de Groot through her will. Although de Groot had not explicitly restricted 
disposal of the works, she had requested that the Metropolitan give any works it did not want 
to other museums. Instead, many works were sold to private buyers. See 2 MERRYMAN & 
ELSEN, supra note 11, at 617-19; Wise & Wolff, supra note 5, at 113-14, 136-39. 
95. See Wise & Wolff, supra note 5, at 136-39. 
96. See generally ALAND. ULLBERG & PATRICIA ULLBERG, MUSEUM TRUSTEESHIP 22-
25 (1981) (discussing a trustee's responsibility for fundraising). 
97. For example, in a case involving the Reading Public Museum and Art Gallery in 
Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Reading Public Museum & Art Gallery, No. 72430 (C.P. 
Orphans' Ct. Berks County, Pa. Aug. 15, 1991), the citizens of Reading urged the trustees to 
reconsider their decision to sell a substantial number of paintings from the collection. Nego-
tiations followed, and the public eventually voted to use county funds to support the mu-
seum, provided that the museum matched this support through fundraising. 
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Courts also should ask directors to consider plans that involve 
the redistribution of works through a temporary lease rather than 
through a permanent sale - in other words, a sharing of artwork 
among institutions. Sharing may be the most economically sound 
means of allocating resources among museums.98 Courts might sug-
gest that directors attempt to retain a work for the benefit of the 
public by temporarily loaning or renting the work, rather than sell-
ing it outright. The rental of a work provides income to its owner 
while providing another museum with the opportunity to display a 
work it otherwise might not be able to afford.99 This cooperation 
between museums should be supported, particularly during the 
present period of astronomical art prices.100 
A traveling exhibit of an entire collection or selected works 
from the collection similarly serves the directors' obligations. Spe-
cial exhibitions of works and tours "increase the availability of art 
to the viewing public"101 - a goal clearly in line with a director's 
fiduciary duties. At the same time, these tours provide current and 
future income to all participants, including those museums whose 
works comprise the exhibit and those museums that enjoy increased 
attendance as a result of the exhibit.102 A recent case concerning 
the Barnes Foundation involved the substitution of a traveling ex-
hibit for a proposal to deaccession works from its collection as a 
means to raise extensive funds to repair the deteriorating Founda-
tion building.103 The tour of the Barnes collection raised more than 
98. See James Heilbrun, Managing a Museum's Collection, 23 J. ARTS MGMT., L. & SoCY. 
69, 71-72 (1993); see also Ralph Blumenthal, Museums Share More Art to Survive Leaner 
Times, N.Y. T™ES, Dec. 7, 1995, at Bl (discussing novel approaches to the sharing of art 
collections). As Blumenthal notes, "[a]lthough the approaches vary, the government aid and 
slower growth in foundation giving are sending a chill through many art organizations." Id. 
99. See Heilbrun, supra note 98, at 71-72. A variation on the loan, one step closer to a 
full-scale sale, would involve the limited sale of an object. One commentator suggests that 
directors could preserve the assets of a museum and still earn funds by selling a limited 
present interest in the work and keeping for the museum a reversionary interest, thereby 
diminishing the net loss to the museum and to the public. See LEONARD D. DuBoFF, ART 
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 306 (2d ed. 1993). 
100. See Heilbrun, supra note 98, at 72. As an example of trends in art prices, consider 
the 1989 sale of a work by Impressionist Mary Cassatt for $4,510,000. Five years earlier the 
same work had sold for $495,000. See Jay E. Cantor, The Museum's Collection, in THE Eco-
NOMICS OF ART MUSEUMS, supra note 2, at 17, 20; Carol Vogel, Bounding Art Prices Stir 
Echoes of the 80's, N.Y. T™ES, Nov. 9, 1995, at Bl. 
101. Heilbrun, supra note 98, at 74. 
102. See id. at 74-75. 
103. The Barnes Foundation case is not a "pure" deaccessioning case because it involved 
a trust with restrictions regarding access and removal of works based on the will of the crea-
tor, Alfred C. Barnes. Both the deaccessioning plan and the traveling exhibit violated the 
terms of the trust. But the request to permit the traveling exhibit gained court approval and 
provides an example of an alternative more in line with a director's fiduciary duties. This 
Note does not aim to express an opinion on the court's decision to allow a violation of the 
terms of the trust but merely points out that, in the deaccessioning case where no donor 
restrictions exist, this alternative may be uncontroversial and both economically and socially 
beneficial. For greater detail regarding the Barnes Foundation and the scandal surrounding 
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seventeen million dollars in rental fees. The Foundation used 
twelve million dollars to modernize its facilities and applied the re-
mainder to the Foundation's endowment and operating costs.104 
C. Nature of the Buyer 
If the court does not perceive an alternative to sale, the court 
still must consider the final factor - whether the intended buyer 
will defeat the public good of the sale. Public purpose would not be 
served by deaccessioning works in order to meet operating ex-
penses without regard to the placement of those works, as each 
work lost to public viewing may jeopardize the museum's ability to 
cite public benefit as a legitimate goal. As a result, courts must 
differentiate between public and private buyers. Keeping the art-
work in the hands of an organization that permits public viewing 
would adhere more closely to directors' duty to the beneficiaries 
and to the terms of the museum.10s 
In satisfying the public-purpose requirement, courts must bal-
ance the interest in :finding a charitable buyer with another concern: 
obtaining the highest price for the deaccessioned assets. If courts 
require directors to sell objects to another museum, a tension devel-
ops between "maximizing dollar value and protecting the public's 
right of access to cultural artifacts."106 Public nonprofit organiza-
tions often lack the :financial resources to compete with private buy-
ers for the purchase of works of art. As a result, directors often will 
be forced to forego the maximum sale price in order to keep the 
work accessible to the public.101 
This balancing should be of utmost concern in any deaccession-
ing decision. Courts should encourage directors to use their best 
it, see Anne Higonnet, Whither the Barnes?, ART IN AMERICA, March 1994, at 62; Carol 
Vogel, A Controversial Man in an Eccentric Place, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1993, § 2, at 1. 
104. See Carol Vogel, An Art Tour Comes Home, Its Fortune Made, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
1995, § 2, at 47. 
105. Not all public buyers are necessarily equally good. For example, although a sale 
from a museum in the United States to a foreign museum involves a sale to another public 
institution, the locality may be so inaccessible to the American public - even more so for 
the local public that previously had enjoyed the work - as to place it on the same level as a 
sale to a private buyer within the United States. Though a sale to a public buyer is generally 
preferable, there are certainly times when a public buyer is the practical equivalent of a 
private buyer. See WEIL, supra note 6, at 112 (discussing the dilemma of varying price 
thresholds for public institutions in the same locality as compared to a distant community or 
a foreign country); Suzanne Muchnic, Don't Hate Him Because His Museum Is Filthy Rich, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, at 20 (discussing an incident in which a group of British museums 
and donors collected funds sufficient to prevent the J. Paul Getty Museum in California from 
purchasing a Canova sculpture that originally belonged to a British estate); Judd Tully, Who 
Owns N. Y. Museum's Old Masters?, WASH. PoST, Jan. 12, 1995, at Cl (equating a sale from a 
museum to private hands with a sale to a foreign museum). 
106. David R. Gabor, Comment, Deaccessioning Fine Art Works: A Proposal for Height-
ened Scrutiny, 36 UCLA L. REv. 1005, 1037 (1989). 
107. See WEIL, supra note 6, at 112. 
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efforts to facilitate a sale that is profitable and keeps the artwork 
available for public observation.1os This type of transaction best 
serves the interest of the public. Accordingly, courts should require 
museums to sell to public buyers, unless the potential income of a 
private sale is significantly higher. 
Museums may be able to engineer a purchase by a public buyer 
by finding several museums interested in the same work who would 
be willing to share the work on a rotating basis.109 This kind of 
cooperative effort also may solve the problem of divergent pub-
lics110 by allowing even broader access to the work - the same 
work now may be accessible to the "public" of several states or 
countries. 
Courts also should support the implementation of "preemption 
agreements" that provide a guarantee of a fair balance between in-
come and public access. A preemption agreement gives a qualified 
public institution the option to match a bid made by a private bid-
der within a specified number of days - in contract terms, a right 
of first refusal. If the public institution matches the private bid, the 
institution receives a graduated discount, depending on the amount 
of the sale.111 This type of agreement was implemented recently by 
the New York Historical Society, Sotheby's, and the New York 
State Attorney General.112 The agreement allowed institutions 
such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art, Vassar College, and the 
Corning Museum of Glass to purchase works that otherwise would 
have been sold to private buyers.113 The protection to the public 
interest afforded by this agreement is worth duplicating in other 
jurisdictions. 
108. It would be unrealistic to make an absolute requirement that directors sell only to 
other museums. Even the codes of ethics do not adhere to this limitation: 
In disposing of an object, due consideration must be given the museum community in 
general as well as the wishes and financial needs of the institution. Sales to, or ex-
changes between, institutions should be considered as well as disposal through the trade. 
In addition to the financial return from disposals, the museum should consider the full 
range of factors affecting the public interest. 
AMERICAN ASSN. OF MUSEUMS, MUSEUM Ennes 13 {1978). 
109. See STEPHEN E. WEIL, Custody Without Title, in BEAUTY AND nm BEASTS, supra 
note 3, at 151, 152-59 (discussing several cases involving joint-ownership arrangements). 
110. See supra note 105. 
111. The preemption agreement developed by the New York Historical Society, 
Sotheby's, and the New York State Attorney General stipulates that if the successful bid 
price (the price declared by the auctioneer) of the lot is $25,000 or less, the public institution 
receives a 10% discount. If the bid price is more than $25,000 but less than or equal to 
$100,000, the discount is 5%. Finally, if the bid price exceeds $100,000 and the bid price is 
greater than the high pre-sale estimate published in the catalogue for the sale, the discount is 
3%. See Stephen E. Weil, Miscellaneous Materials Relevant to Litigation Update, in LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION 429, 431 (A.L.1.-A.B.A. 1995). 
112. See id. 
113. See Carol Vogel, Inside Art, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at BS; Carol Vogel, Met Mu-
seum Pre-empts Sale of Old Master, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1995, at C3. 
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As part of the third prong of the test, a court may approve a sale 
to a private buyer if the sale would be substantially more lucrative 
than one to a public purchaser, and the court is convinced that the 
sale is in the best interest of the public - in other words, the in-
crease in income outweighs the decrease in access. This situation, 
though perhaps least desirable, remains an option as long as the 
court is satisfied that the directors will fulfill their duties to the pub-
lic through the use of the sale proceeds. In such a situation, the 
undesirable results of this public-to-private transfer may be mini-
mized by a conveyance that requires the buyer periodically to dis-
play the work publicly.114 By consistently suggesting these less 
absolute alternatives, courts will instill in directors an understand-
ing of the preeminence of the public's interest as museum 
beneficiaries. 
CONCLUSION 
In February 1993, the New York Historical Society closed its 
doors after 188 years in existence - it no longer could afford to 
operate.115 Museums will continue to desire new art for their col-
lections, but - in cases like the Historical Society - their most 
pressing concern is survival. With the present reductions in govern-
ment funding and no likelihood of increases in sight, museums must 
find innovative solutions to survive. Although drastic, museums 
must be able to consider the possibility of selling some of their as-
sets in order to remain solvent. A lack of museums would make 
real the belief that art is only for the wealthy. Surely the public 
cannot be served best by a policy in which one interest - the art 
itself - is allowed to prevail absolutely over the very important 
interest of providing public access to the art through the mainte-
nance of museums as healthy institutions. The only way museums 
can serve the interests of the public is if they are given the means to 
survive, which may require periodically allowing them to deacces-
sion works from their collections. It is unrealistic to demand that 
museums hold on to works that do not serve their mission or those 
for which they cannot care properly, while forsaking the benefits of 
selling these works to others who might put them to better use. 
Although not yet employed, the courts have an existing legal 
framework within which to evaluate deaccessioning proposals: the 
concept of trustee fiduciary duty, namely, the twin duties of loyalty 
and care. The courts can instruct museum directors that they may 
114. See DuBoFF, supra note 99, at 306. Bargaining with private parties to display works 
may result in lowering the price. Again, balancing must be undertaken to determine whether 
this sacrifice in price is justified by the public display. 
115. See David W. Dunlap, Historical Society Shuts Its Doors but Still Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 20, 1993, § 1, at 9. 
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be able to fulfi11 their fiduciary obligations while pursuing a deac-
cessioning plan but only if directors can prove that they have ar-
rived at this option with the public's best interest in mind and after 
careful consideration of less extreme alternatives. This proviso will 
prevent the use of deaccessioning as a ciutch for poorly managed 
institutions. These demands represent the higher 'standard the law 
expects of trustees. 
In May 1995, the Historical Society reopened and has since cele-
brated its rebirth with a series of exhibits, received a $7.5 million 
grant to create a study center for its collection of decorative and 
fine arts, and developed a program by which the building space may 
be rented out for parties - illustrating the benefits of permitting 
deaccessioning to meet operating expenses in appropriate circum-
stances.116 Earlier in the year, a New York court allowed the insti-
tution to deaccession sixteen million dollars worth of Old Master 
paintings and then apply these funds toward operating expenses. 
The Director of the Historical Society summarized the controversy 
when she said that to consider deaccessioning only to buy more art 
when the Historical Society has been closed for over two years due 
to lack of working capital just "doesn't make any sense at this 
point."117 
116. See Bob Morris, The Dress: Black Tie and Goggles, N.Y. T~rns, Oct. 15, 1995, § 1, 
at 43. 
117. Tully, supra note 105, at Cl. 
